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Charter Schools, Academy Schools, and Related-
Party Transactions: Same Scams, Different 
Countries
Preston C. Green III
Chelsea E. Connery 
INTRODUCTION 
In the course of the last quarter century, governmental 
entities in both the United States and England have sought to 
encourage educational innovation by creating publicly funded 
schools that are independent from many of the rules that apply 
to locally controlled schools. These schools are called charter 
schools in the United States and academy schools (academies) in 
England.1  Private companies run a high percentage of these 
charter schools and academies. In the United States, these 
companies are commonly referred to as educational 
management organizations (EMOs).2  In England, these 
organizations are called academy trusts (ATs).3 
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1. Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, Lessons for US Charter Schools from the 
Growth of Academies in England, BROOKINGS (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/lessons-for-us-charter-schools-from-the-growth-of-
academies-in-england/ [https://perma.cc/LGB2-GNTN]. 
2. BRUCE BAKER & GARY MIRON, THE BUSINESS OF CHARTER SCHOOLING: 
UNDERSTANDING THE POLICIES THAT CHARTER OPERATORS USE FOR FINANCIAL 
BENEFIT 7 (Dec. 2015), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/rb_baker-
miron_charter_revenue_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPH-2TRQ].  
3. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017: FOR ACADEMIES, MULTI-
ACADEMY TRUSTS AND MAINTAINED SCHOOLS 43 (Jan. 2017), 
https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/28078/ [https://perma.cc/FW7A-KPT6]. 
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EMOs and ATs frequently engage in related-party 
transactions for a number of services including educational 
technology, real estate, and consulting.4  Related-party 
transactions are business deals between companies with special, 
pre-existing relationships.5  These arrangements can occur, for 
example, between affiliated companies or a parent company and 
its subsidiaries.6  Although related-party transactions are legal, 
they can create harmful conflicts of interest.7  As a result, in 
both the charter and academy sectors, governmental entities 
have created monitoring systems to protect against wasteful and 
fraudulent related-party transactions.8 
However, despite the existence of these monitoring 
systems, numerous instances of problematic related-party 
transactions have occurred in charter schools and academies. 
Using comparative legal research methodologies, this article 
attempts to explain why the monitoring systems of each domain 
have such a difficult time regulating related-party transactions. 
Following an explanation of the methods, Section II investigates 
the prominent role EMOs and ATs play in the expansion of 
charter schools and academies.  Subsequently, Section III 
examines data on EMO and AT engagement in related-party 
transactions and presents examples of EMOs and ATs abusing 
the legality of these transactions.  These two sections together 
demonstrate the need to consider how these organizations are 
monitored.  In Section IV we then analyze the current systems in 
place to monitor related-party transactions in charter schools and 
academies and make suggestions for improvement.  
4. We discuss related-party transactions in charter schools and academies in more
detail in Section II. 
5. ART BERKOVITZ & RICHARD RAMPELL, RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS CAN
BE AN INVESTMENT RED FLAG (Aug. 29, 2002), 
https://www.artberkowitz.com/article7.htm [https://perma.cc/6G97-XZND]. 
6. See generally AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS., AU SECTION 334: 
RELATED PARTIES 1961, 1961 n.1, 
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Archived/Pages/AU334.aspx [https://perma.cc/3TFH-8V2T] 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
7. Elizabeth A. Gordon, Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance, 9 
CORP. GOV. ADVANCES IN FIN. ECON. 1, 7 (2004) (explaining the conflict of interest view 
of related-party transactions).  
8. We analyze these related-party-transaction monitoring systems in Section III.
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I. Methodology
To achieve the goals of this article, we apply the 
comparative legal research methodology of functionalism. 
Functionalism examines the approaches that different legal 
systems use to solve conflicts.9  This methodology looks for 
“functional equivalents” that countries have developed to solve a 
particular problem.10  Despite the countries’ legal differences, 
their solutions may be similar or even identical.11 
Functionalism is especially appropriate for the comparison 
made in this article because the United States and England have 
similar, common-law legal systems.12  However, merely 
comparing the legal rules for each country may be insufficient 
because of contextual differences.13  Therefore, we supplement 
the functional method by employing the law-in-context 
method.14  The goal of the law-in-context method is to discern 
how the different legal concepts work in practice.15  Thus, we 
have included analysis of the following materials: (1) 
educational, legal, and accounting research articles pertaining to 
charter schools and academies; (2) governmental reports and 
audits of charter schools and academies; and (3) media 
investigations of problematic related-party transactions in the 
charter school and academy sectors. 
9. Mark Van Hoecke, METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 1, 9,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291373684_Methodology_of_ 
Comparative_Legal_Research [https://perma.cc/83K9-SCYE] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
10. Id.
11. Id. at 10. 
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Van Hoecke, supra note 9, at 16.
15. Id.
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II. The Role that EMOs and ATs Play in the Expansion
of Charter Schools and Academies 
A. Charter Schools
Since 1991, 44 states and the District of Columbia have 
passed charter school legislation.16  The argument for the initial 
creation of charter schools was that, with their greater flexibility, 
these schools could foster necessary innovations in the public 
education system.17  Charter schools operate under a contract, or 
charter, with a charter school authorizer.18  The charter specifies 
the organization and the management of the school as well as 
measures for academic success.19  There are more than 7,000 
charter schools that educate more than 3 million students20—6% 
of the nation’s public-school population.21 
Charter schools have grown steadily over the past 10 years, 
adding 300 to 400 schools each year.22  EMO-operated charter 
schools have also become more prominent.23  EMOs are for-
profit or non-profit companies that contract with charter school 
boards to provide educational and management services to 
charter schools.24  In 2009-10, EMOs managed around 30% of 
charter schools and educated 35% of charter school students 
16. Micah Ann Wixon, 50-State Comparison Charter School Policies, EDUC.
COMM’N STATES (2018), https://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z5SK-BVR3]. 





20. Rebecca David & Kevin Hesla, Estimated Public Charter School Enrollment, 




21. Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics., Public Charter School Enrollment, THE CONDITION 
OF EDUCATION (Mar. 2018), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/ indicator_cgb.asp 
[https://perma.cc/CSN7-MSV2].  
22. Sarah Cohodes, Charter Schools and the Achievement Gap, THE FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN 1 (Win. 2018), https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/ 
sites/futureofchildren/files/resource-links/charter_schools_compiled.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PS7R-ZFTY].  
23. BAKER & MIRON, supra note 2, at 7. 
24. Id.
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nationwide.25  In 2016-17, EMOs operated 35% of all charter 
schools, constituting 42% of enrollment.26 
The expansion of EMOs is not happenstance. In fact, 
charter-school proponents believe that EMOs can achieve 
expansion faster than stand-alone charter schools because of 
economies of scale and “the development expertise needed to 
secure financial expansion.”27  Philanthropic foundations have 
played a significant role in promoting the growth of EMO-run 
charter schools.28  In the 2000s, major philanthropic foundations 
in the US dramatically increased funding to EMOs while 
proportionately decreasing funding to traditional public 
schools.29  Specifically, recent evidence suggests that 
philanthropic foundations prefer to fund national-level advocacy 
and EMOs to stimulate charter school growth.30  However, due 
to the decentralized nature of the US education system, 
foundations also direct significant funds to state and local 
levels.31 
In addition to philanthropic organizations, the federal 
government has recently promoted the growth of EMOs through 
the Charter Schools Program (CSP), which allocates funding to 
expand the number of “high-quality” charter schools in the 
25. NAT’L ALLIANCE PUB. CHARTER SCHS., CMO AND EMO PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: A GROWING PHENOMENON IN THE CHARTER SCHOOL SECTOR: PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOL DASHBOARD DATA FROM 2007-08, 20-08-09, AND 2009-10 1, 
http://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/migrated/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/NAPCS-CMO-EMO-DASHBOARD-
DETAILS_20111103T102812.pdf [https://perma.cc/54A8-5HC7] (last visited Mar. 30, 
2019). 
26. REBECCA DAVID, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW: 
2016-17 SCHOOL YEAR 3, https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default 
/files/documents/2018-08/napcs_management_report_web%20New%20Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y8CJ-KDP5] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
27. Benjamin M. Teresa & Ryan M. Good, Speculative Charter School Growth in
the Case of UNO Charter School Network in Chicago, 54 URBAN AFF. REV. 1107, 1112 
(2018).  
28. GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER SHANK, NEPC REVIEW: CHARTER 
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 2017 (CREDO, JUNE 2017) 2 (Sep. 2017), 
https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/reviews/TTR%20Miron%20CMOs_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6CL-7VWD].  
29. Joseph J. Ferrare & R. Renee Setari, Converging on Choice: The Interstate Flow
of Foundation Dollars to Charter School Organizations, 47 EDUC. RESEARCHER 34, 34 
(2017). 
30. Id. at 35. 
31. Id. 
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country.32  In 2017, the federal government spent $253 million 
pursuant to the CSP.33  Of that amount, $52 million went to a 
newly created EMO-expansion program titled “Replication and 
Expansion of High-Quality Charter Schools.”34 
B. Academies
Academies were first introduced in 2000 as the City 
Academy Program.35  City academies were to replace locally run 
schools in urban areas that were deemed to be failing by the 
school inspection body Ofsted, or that were underachieving.36  
The Education Act 2002 permitted academies to open outside of 
urban areas.37 
Eight years later, Parliament enacted the Academies Act 
2010.38  This statute extended the academy option, until then 
limited to struggling schools, to include successful schools at 
both the primary and secondary levels.39  The government 
financed conversion costs and provided considerable financial 
32. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., WELCOME TO ED’S CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM (Oct. 16, 
2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/csp/index.html [https://perma.cc/HK99-
LGR8].  
33. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AWARDS $253 MILLION 
IN GRANTS TO EXPAND CHARTER SCHOOLS (Sep. 28, 2017),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-awards-253-million-
grants-expand-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/683Z-PG4Z].  
34.  NAT’L ALLIANCE PUB. CHARTER SCHS., NATIONAL ALLIANCE 
CONGRATULATES RECIPIENTS OF 2017 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CHARTER 






R_0VJcCbuvQ_jSv-8g [https://perma.cc/HME2-8EDC].  
35. Ann West & Elizabeth Bailey, The Development of the Academies Programme: 
‘Privatising’ School-Based Education in England 1986-2013, 61 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 
137, 143 (2013). 
36. Id. at 144.
37. Id. at 145.
38. See generally Academy Act 2010, c. 32 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/32/pdfs/ukpga_20100032_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2U8-F7D2]. 
39. Id. § 3(1).
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incentives to encourage schools to convert.40  The number of 
academies increased dramatically as a result of these policy 
changes.  In 2010, there were 203 academies throughout 
England, all of them serving secondary schools with high 
proportions of disadvantaged students.41  As of December 2018, 
there were 8,333 academies, constituting 36.8% of England’s 
state funded schools.42  About 67% of England’s secondary 
schools and 30% of its primary schools have achieved academy 
status.43 
Academy trusts (ATs) run academies.44  ATs are nonprofit 
private trusts that enter into funding agreements with the 
Secretary of State for Education.45  Single academy trusts 
(SATs) “. . . run one academy and so have a single funding 
agreement with the Secretary.”46  Multi-academy trusts (MATs) 
run more than one academy “and so have both a master funding 
agreement with the Secretary . . . as well as a supplemental 
funding agreements for each academy.”47 
The English government has supported the growth of 
MATs in order to encourage the rapid expansion of academies.48  
One strategy involved funding: “The more schools in [a MAT], 
the more funding was available for its central office activities.”49  
This funding strategy worked.  In 2012, there were 312 MATs, 
which ran 39% of all academies.50  By 2015, almost two-thirds 
of academies were in MATs, and 517 MATs had 2 to 5 
40. Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, England Confronts the Limits of School 
Autonomy 6 (Nat’l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Educ., Working Paper 232) (Oct. 
25, 2016), https://ncspe.tc.columbia.edu/working-papers/OP232.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XV8Q-DAU8]; West & Bailey, supra note 35, at 139.  
41. Ladd & Fiske, supra note 40, at 6.
42. DEP’T FOR EDUC., OPEN ACADEMIES, FREE SCHOOLS, STUDIO SCHOOLS AND








48. LADD & FISKE, ENGLAND CONFRONTS THE LIMITS, supra note 40, at 6.
49. Id.
50. Melanie C.M. Ehren & David Godfrey, External Accountability of Collaborative 
Arrangement; A Case Study of a Multi Academy Trust in England, 29 EDUC. ASSESSMENT 
EVALUATION & ACCOUNTABILITY 339, 340 (2017). 
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academies, 98 had 6 to 15, and 19 MATs were responsible for 
16 or more academies.51  In 2017, MATs ran 73% of all 
academies.52 
The role of MATs in academy expansion continues to be 
encouraged by the Department for Education (DfE), the 
governmental department responsible for education in 
England.53  In 2016, the DfE, announced its full-throttled 
support for MATs in a white paper titled Educational Excellence 
Everywhere.54  This paper called for the academization of all 
English schools by 2022.55  Initially, the DfE intended this 
transition to be mandatory, but, following strong resistance, the 
DfE modified its approach to strong encouragement.56  The 
white paper declared that MATs were the mechanism for 
enabling the spread of academies because: 
MATs are the only structures which formally bring together 
leadership, autonomy, funding and accountability across a 
group of academies in an enduring way, and are the best 
long term formal arrangement for stronger schools to 
support the improvement of weaker schools.57 
The DfE provided several rationales for declaring this 
belief.  For instance, MATs would provide “improved 
opportunities and support for teachers” and “a broader 
curriculum and more opportunities for children.”58  MATs 
would also help build infrastructure by “expand[ing] the reach 
and influence of the most successful leaders” and offering “more 
senior roles and rapid progression opportunities” so that “the 
51. Id.
52. ANNE WEST & DAVID WOLFE, ACADEMIES, THE SCHOOL SYSTEM IN ENGLAND
AND A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 4 (June 2018), http://www.lse.ac.uk/social-
policy/Assets/Documents/PDF/Research-reports/Academies-Vision-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T6FY-VNVY].  
53.  DEP’T FOR EDUC., ABOUT US, https://www.gov.uk /government/ 
organisations/department-for-education/about (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).  




55. Id. at 15. 
56. Andrew Eyles et al., Academies 2 – The New Batch: The Changing Nature of 
Academy Schools in England, 39 FISCAL STUD. 121, 124 (2018).  
57. DEP’T FOR EDUC., EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE EVERYWHERE, supra note 54, at 
57. 
58. Id. at 16. 
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best leaders can play new, more influential roles across more 
schools.”59  Moreover, the DfE claimed that MATs could 
expand into high need areas in a manner that the best local 
educational authorities never could.60 
III. EMOS, ATS, AND RELATED-PARTY
TRANSACTIONS AND EXAMPLES OF ABUSE 
A. Charter Schools
In the United States, there is no nationwide compilation of 
related-party transactions.  However, the Grand Canyon Institute 
performed an analysis of related-party transactions in Arizona 
during the 2013-14 school year.61  This study found that 77% of 
the state’s charter schools had engaged in related-party 
transactions.62  Many of these transactions were between 
nonprofit EMOs and for-profit related-parties, which called into 
question the nonprofit nature of these EMOs.63  Furthermore, 
48% of charter school expenditures for contracts, leases, and 
rents for that year were owed to for-profit related parties, 
totaling $497.5 million.64 
There have been many questionable related-party 
transactions involving real estate deals.65  For example, a for-
59. Id. at 14. 
60. Id. at 15. 
61. CURTIS CARDINE & DAVE WELLS, FOLLOWING THE MONEY: TWENTY YEARS
OF CHARTER SCHOOL FINANCES IN ARIZONA (A META-ANALYSIS OF CHARTER SCHOOL 
FINANCIALS AND WHAT THEY TELL US) 3,11,12 (Grand Canyon Institute, 2017)), 
http://grandcanyoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads /2017/09/GCI-Policy-Report-
Following-the-Money_Sept_17_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6D7-CC69].  
62. Id. at 11. 
63. Id. at 32. 
64. Id. at 4.
65. See, e.g., Catherine Candisky, Ohio Taxpayers Paid $7.7 Million to Renovate 
Charter-School Building Valued at $2.4 Million, COLUMBIA DISPATCH (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180729/ohio-taxpayers-paid-77-million-to-renovate-
charter-school-building-valued-at-24-million [https://perma.cc/B5D8-VKAP]; 
Academica’s Florida Real Estate Operations, IN THE PUB. INTEREST (June 2016), 
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_Academica_Florida_Rese 
arch_Brief_June_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/78SH-UA9W]; Ronald Huefner & Marie 
Blouin, Control Issues in Charter Schools: An Examination of New York State 
Comptroller’s Audits, CPA J. (Apr. 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com 
/2018/04/30/control-issues-in-charter-schools/; Jeremy Mohler, Charter Schools Are a Hot 
Real Estate Market – and That’s Bad for Students, IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Oct. 18, 2018), 
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profit EMO named Charter Schools USA (“CSUSA”), which 
operates 49 charter schools in Florida, conducts its real estate 
deals through several affiliated businesses.66  The facilities costs 
for CSUSA-managed schools were 32% of their budget—more 
than 13% of the national average for charter school facilities 
costs.67 
The real estate deals between Imagine Schools, a non-profit 
EMO that operates more than 60 schools, and its for-profit 
affiliate, SchoolHouse Finance, are even more extreme.  These 
charter schools can spend up to 40% on rent, which creates a 
tight budget for educational necessities, such as textbooks.68  In 
Renaissance Academy for Math & Science of Missouri v. 
Imagine Schools, a federal judge ordered Imagine Schools to 
pay almost $1 million to one of its former schools for charging it 
excessive rent.69  The court’s ruling suggested that Imagine 
Schools was essentially taking advantage of the charter school: 
the EMO profited from the excessive rent and failed to tell the 
school’s board of directors how the cost might disrupt the 
school’s ability to pay for textbooks and teacher salaries.70 
An audit conducted by the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), the federal agency’s 
watchdog, provided further evidence of the emerging danger.71  
This audit, which assessed the risks posed by charter school 
https://medium.com/in-the-public-interest/charter-schools-are-a-hot-real-estate-market-
and-thats-bad-for-students-153fe8554bb4 [https://perma.cc/YV77-KHZ8]; Piet Van Lier, 
Public Good vs. Private Profit: Imagine Schools, Inc. in Ohio, POLICY MATTERS OHIO 3 
(May 2010), http://www.policymattersohio.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/ImagineSchools2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BXZ-B49L].  
66. Pat Hall & Sue Legg, The League in Action on For-Profit Charters
LWVEDUCATION (Oct. 1, 2016), http://lwveducation.com/the-league-in-action-on-for-
profit-charters/ [https://perma.cc/FR3T-3B8Q].  
67. Id.
68. Tim Walker, What the Charter School Industry Can Learn from Enron – Before 
It’s Too Late, NEATODAY (Mar. 31, 2017), http://neatoday.org /2017/03/31/charter-
schools-second-coming-of-enron/ [https://perma.cc/A9CG-Y659].  
69. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 24-25, Renaissance Acad. for Math 
& Sci. of Mo. v. Imagine Schs., No. 4:13-CV-00645-NKL (W.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://courtweb.pamd.uscourts.gov/courtwebsearch/mowd/YgEGzNViWt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2KT-MHUN].  
70. Id. at 18-19.
71. Nationwide Assessment of Charter and Education Management Organizations: 
Final Audit Report, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFF. INSPECT. GEN. (Sept. 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2016/a02m0012.pdf 
 [https://perma.cc/8KFV-6LU4]. 
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EMOs to the Department’s objectives, examined 33 charter 
schools from six states: California, Florida, Michigan, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.72  The OIG found 36 instances 
of internal control weaknesses—13 of these instances involved 
related-party transactions.73  These weaknesses were concerning 
because their presence increased the possibility of financial 
fraud and abuse, and additionally, they increased the risk that 
students would not receive services consistent with federal 
program objectives.74 
B. Academies
In contrast to charter schools, there are data regarding the 
scope of related-party transactions in the academy sector.  These 
data show that related-party transactions are quite common.  The 
Education Funding Agency (“EFA”), the agency responsible for 
academy oversight, found that 976 ATs—or 43%—had 
disclosed related-party transactions during the 2012-13 school 
year.75  These transactions totaled £71 million.76  In 2015-16, 
72. Id. at 5, 8. The Office of Inspector General referred to both EMOs and charter 
management organizations (“CMOs”) as CMOs.  The OIG defined a CMO as “any 
organization that operated or managed one or more schools, whether under contract or as 
charter holders, without regard to the profit motive of the organization.” Id. at 1 n.1.  
EMOs, by contrast, provide “whole school operation” services. Id. (inner quotations 
omitted).  For consistency purposes, we use the term EMO to refer to the entities described 
in the audit. 
73. Id. at 40. 
74. Id. at 16. 
75. Review of Related Party Transactions in Academies, EDUC. FUND. AGENCY, 3
(Nov. 2014) [hereinafter, Review of Related Party Transactions], 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/governmen
t/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390
210/EFA_review_of_related_party_transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFL2-TAP5]. .  In
2017, the Education Funding Agency merged with the Skills Agency to become the 
Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA).  Justine Greening, Department for 




76. Comptroller & Auditor General, Investigation into the Education Funding 
Agency’s oversight of related party transactions at Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT 
OFFICE. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-the-education-
funding-agencys-oversight-of-related-party-transactions-at-durand-academy/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XPC-97ZA] [hereinafter Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE].   
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1,155 ATs (40%) disclosed related-party transactions.77  These 
transactions increased to 3,033, totaling almost £121 million.78  
Moreover, ATs had entered into 70 related-party transactions, 
each of which exceeded £250,000.79  These transactions 
amounted to almost £62 million.80 
The EFA began to record the frequency of related-party 
transactions in the academy sector because of the irregularities 
involving the Durand Academy Trust.81  This AT ran an early 
years center—comparable to pre-K—as well as a primary and 
secondary school.82  Because of problems revealed in the AT’s 
financial statements, the EFA investigated the trust’s related-
party transactions.83  This investigation identified two 
particularly troubling arrangements.  The first transaction was 
with a company owned by the executive head for the 
management of the AT’s leisure and accommodation facilities.84  
This company received £790,000 for the management of these 
properties over a three-year period.85  The second involved a 
contract for public relations and communications with a 
company owned by one of the trustees.86  This company 
received £20,000 per month for its services.87  The EFA ordered 
the trust to terminate its contract with the executive head’s 
77. Academy School Sector in England: Consolidated annual report and accounts 







81. Rajeev Syal, Nearly Half of Academy Trusts Paid Millions to ‘Dubious’ 
Contracts, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/nov/13/nearly-half-academy-trusts-related-
party-transactions [https://perma.cc/9B3A-ENH5].  
82. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 7.  Because of
concerns over finances and conflicts of interests, the Department for Education terminated 
its funding agreement with the Durand Academy Trust in 2018.  Freddie Whittaker, 
Troubled Durand Academy Reopens as Van Gogh Primary, but  Land Issues 
Continue , SCHS.  WEEK. (Sep. 7, 2018), https://schoolsweek.co.uk/troubled-
durand-academy-reopens-as-van-gogh-primary-but-land-issues-continue/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KT4-WAH3].  
83. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 5. 
84. Id. at 15. 
85. Id. at 12. 
86. Id. at 16. 
87. Id.
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company.88  With respect to the trustee’s company, the EFA 
instructed the trust either to end the contract when it expired or 
conduct an open bidding process if the trust still needed the 
services.89 
The related-party transactions involving the Wakefield City 
Academies Trust (“WCAT”) also garnered much media 
attention.90  In 2015, this MAT, which sponsored 21 primary 
and secondary schools throughout Yorkshire, had received £10 
million in funding from the DfE to set up “high-performing 
academy hubs in areas having some of the greatest need.”91  
However, in the following year, the MAT came under scrutiny 
after it was revealed that it paid £440,000 to companies owned 
by the CEO and his daughter.92  The MAT declared in a 
statement that the contracts were appropriate because they had 
been put out to bid.93  However, a leaked DfE report identified 
16 breaches of academy finance rules committed by WCAT, 
including the trust paying the CEO £82,000 for less than 15 
weeks of work.94  This lack of governance and financial 
management put WCAT “in an extremely vulnerable 
88. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 21.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Rebecca Akrofile, Academy Chain Comes under Fire for Financial
Conflicts of Interest, THE EDUCATOR (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.theeducator.com/news/academy-chain-comes-fire-financial-conflicts-interest/; 
Will Hazell, Wakefield City Academy Trust Paid £83K to Former CEO’s Firm, TES (Jan. 
30, 2018), https://www.tes.com/news/wakefield-city-academies-trust-paid-ps83k-former-
ceos-firm [https://perma.cc/2MZW-3RMF]; John Roberts & Don Mort, Yorkshire Academy 
Chain Defends Spending More Than £300,000 on IT Deal with Firm Run by Its Own Boss , 
YORKSHIRE POST (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/education/yorkshire-academy-chain-defends-
spending-more-than-300-000-on-it-deal-with-firm-run-by-its-own-boss-1-8196191 
[https://perma.cc/K3RH-UN7N]; Sonia Sodha, The Great Academy Schools Scandal, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018 /jul/22/academy-
schools-scandal-failing-trusts [https://perma.cc/78H5-49K8]. 
91. Dep’t for Educ. & the Rt Hon. Nicky Morgan, Speech: Nicky Morgan: one 
nation education, GOV.UK (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ 
nicky-morgan-one-nation-education [https://perma.cc/3YUY-QA32]. 
92. Eleanor Busby, Academy Chain Spends £440,000 on Deals with Firms Run by 
CEO and His Daughter, TES  (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.tes.com/news/academy-chain-
spends-ps440000-deals-firms-run-ceo-and-his-daughter [https://perma.cc/A3S4-KZET]. 
93. Id.
94. Eleanor Busby, Exclusive: ‘Extreme’ DfE Concern over Academy Trust that 
Paid CEO £82K for 15 Weeks’ Work, TES (Nov. 4, 2016), 
https://www.tes.com/news/exclusive-extreme-dfe-concern-over-academy-trust-paid-ceo-
ps82k-15-weeks-work [https://perma.cc/EJD8-JFNQ].  
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position.”95  In September 2017, WCAT declared that it was 
dissolving and ceasing the operation of its academy schools.96 
Parliament has expressed concerns about the EFA’s ability 
to police related-party transactions in the academy sector.  For 
instance, in a 2014 report, the House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts expressed that the “Agency might not know the 
true extent of related-party transactions in all education 
providers—even if it implements sophisticated monitoring 
arrangements—in the same way that the accountability system 
in local authority settings might identify these transactions.”97 
Similarly, a report commissioned by the Education Select 
Committee, published in the same year, concluded that “the 
checks and balances on academy trusts in relation to conflicts of 
interest are still too weak.”98 
Despite these concerns, the EFA has refused to outlaw 
related-party transactions.99  Instead, the agency has identified a 
number of benefits to these business deals.  For instance, the 
EFA has asserted that related-party transactions can reduce costs 
through economies of scale.100  Specifically, the AT can achieve 
economies of scale by sharing services, such as facilities 
management services or catering or staffing.101  ATs can also 
benefit from the “in-house” expertise—especially in situations 
where the “trust is related to a recognized national lead in a 
given area.”102  It has also sought to improve the monitoring 
95. Id.
96. Press Ass’n, Failing Academy Trust to Pull out of 21 Schools, THE GUARDIAN
(Sep. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/education/ 2017/sep/09 /failing-academy-
trust-to-pull-out-of-21-schools [https://perma.cc/H7AQ-NMEN].  
97. Education Funding Agency and Department for Education financial statements: 
Sixty-first Report of Session 2013-14, HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMTE. PUB. ACCTS., 12 
(May 12, 2014), https://publications.parliament.uk 
/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubacc/1063/1063.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW6U-J35C].  
98. TOBY GREANY & JEAN SCOTT, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN ACADEMY 




99. HOUSE OF COMMONS EDUC. COMMTE., ACADEMIES AND FREE SCHOOLS 
(FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2014-15) 46 (Jan. 21, 2015), 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Education/report-education-
academies-and-schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6Y4-7ZNJ]. 
100. Review of Related Party Transactions, supra note 75, at 21. 
101. Id.
102. Id.
2019 SAME SCAMS, DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 423 
system of related-party transactions.  We analyze these attempts 
in the following section. 
IV. MONITORING OF RELATED-PARTY
TRANSACTIONS BY CHARTER SCHOOLS AND 
ACADEMIES103 
A. Monitoring Systems for Related-Party Transactions
in Charter Schools and Academies 
Governmental entities have implemented monitoring 
systems to protect against the abuse of related-party transactions 
in the charter-school and academy sectors.  Table 1 provides a 
depiction of these monitoring systems in tabular form. 
Table 1: Monitoring Systems for Related-Party 








documented and in 
the schools’ best 
interest 
External Auditors External Auditors 
Review related 
party contracts for 






oversight to protect 
against related 
party transactions 
Charter Authorizers Education and 
Skills Funding 
Agency (ESFA) 
103. An earlier version of the U.S. charter-school monitoring system analysis
appeared in Preston C. Green III et al., Are Charter Schools the Second Coming of Enron: 
An Examination of the Gatekeepers That Protect Against Dangerous Related-Party 
Transactions in the Charter School Sector, 93 IND. L. J. 1121 (2018).  
104. Id. at 1142-57. 
105. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.








An examination of the related-party transaction monitoring 
systems for EMOs and ATs reveals noteworthy similarities. 
First, each system employs external auditors who are charged 
with ensuring that all related-party transactions are properly 
documented.106  Second, each monitoring system relies on 
governing boards that review related-party transactions for 
possible conflicts of interest.  In the case of charter schools, the 
autonomous charter school boards that contract with the EMOs 
perform this function.107  The ATs perform this role in the 
academy monitoring system.108  Third, each monitoring system 
has entities that provide general fiscal oversight to protect 
against related-party transactions.109  In the case of charter 
schools, the charter authorizer plays that role.110  The Education 
and Skills Funding Agency (“ESFA”), a departmental agency 
sponsored by the DfE,111 performs this task for academies.112  
Finally, each system has an entity that investigates allegations 
made by whistleblowers.113  In the charter school systems, 
charter school authorizers, state auditors, and state departments 
of education are responsible for these investigations.114  The 
ESFA and DfE perform this role with respect to academies.115 
It is also important to note that in the case of charter 
schools, the federal government has not played a prominent role 
in the policing of related-party transactions.  The federal 
government has spent more than $4 billion since 1995 to 
encourage the growth of charter schools without emphasizing 
106. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1142-46; Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFF., 
supra note 76, at 25. 
107. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1150-53.
108.  Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE,  supra note 76, at 25. 
109. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1150-53; Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT
OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25. 
110. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1150-53.
111. EDUC. & SKILLS FUND. AGENCY, ABOUT US , https://www.gov.uk/government
/organisations/education-and-skills-funding-agency/about [https://perma.cc/FTY5-NJZP]. 
112. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
113. Id.
114. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1154-56. 
115. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
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oversight.116  The OIG signaled that it would take a more 
involved role in policing related-party transactions in its 2016 
audit.  In fact, the report made several suggestions for improving 
oversight of related-party transactions, including improving the 
Department’s monitoring of charter school-EMO 
relationships.117  However, President Donald Trump, who came 
into office after this audit was published, has expressed general 
displeasure of federal regulations.118  Moreover, his Secretary of 
Education, Betsy DeVos, has also displayed antipathy toward 
federal regulations.119  Therefore, we have not included the 
federal government as part of the charter-school, related-party-
transaction monitoring system. 
The remainder of this section analyzes the monitoring 
systems for protecting against the abuse of related-party 
transactions in the charter and academy sectors and makes 
suggestions for improvement. 
B. Auditors
1. Charter Schools
Most charter laws require charter schools to submit to 
annual financial audits that comply with statutory or regulatory 
116. Dustin Beilke, New Grants Announced: ED Continues to Pour Millions into 
Charter School Black Hole, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOC. PRWATCH (Sep. 29, 2016), 
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/09/13151/education-department-continues-pour-
millions-tax-dollars-charter-school-blackhole [https://perma.cc/2R8J-7LUK].  
117. Supra note 71, at 30-31.
118. Terry Jones, Deregulation Nation: President Trump Cuts Regulation at Record
Rate, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Aug. 14, 2018, https://www.investors.com/politics/ 
commentary/deregulation-nation-president-trump-cuts-regulations-at-record-rate/ 
[https://perma.cc/3R32-9H5Q]. 
119. See, e.g., David Whitman & Arne Duncan, Betsy DeVos and Her Cone of 
Silence on For-Profit Colleges, BROOKINGS (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges-education-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/E5JD-B35D]; Elissa Nadworthy, DeVos to Make It Tougher for
Defrauded Students to Seek Debt Relief, NPRED (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/07/27/633107206/devos-to-make-it-tougher-for-
defrauded-students-to-seek-debt-relief [https://perma.cc/3HGG-ATFG]; Valerie
Richardson, DeVos Moves to Roll Back Regulations on Federal Aid to Religious Colleges , 
WASH. TIMES (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/may/10/devos-moves-roll-back-regulations-
federal-aid-reli/ [https://perma.cc/C2FY-9KU6].
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standards.120  Although state laws require auditors to be truly 
independent, there have been instances where auditors failed to 
detect problematic related-party transactions because they were 
under the control of the EMO.121  Therefore, charter authorizers 
must take special care to guarantee that auditors are actually 
independent. 
Researchers have also advised auditors of charter schools to 
scrutinize related-party transactions for evidence of abuse.  As 
Marie Blouin and Ronald Huefner observe: “In addition to 
traditional public school audit issues, charter school audits also 
require consideration of the appropriateness and review of 
contracts and transactions with the sponsoring organization,” 
and “conflicts of interest by board members, especially if they 
have ties to the sponsoring organization.”122  This focus would 
be consistent with the two main standards used by charter-
school auditors: generally accepted auditing standards 
(“GAAS”), and generally accepted government auditing 
standards (“GAGAS”).123  Both standards require auditors to 
consider the possible risks of fraud intrinsic to the entities that 
they are investigating.124 
GAAS refers to the standards, established by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), that apply to 
the “ordinary audit of financial statements by the independent 
auditor.”125 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6F-6(g)(5) (2018) (requiring audits to comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-505 (Wet 2018) 
(requiring audits to comply with generally accepted auditing principles); CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 47605(l) (West 2018) (requiring audits to comply with generally accepted accounting
principles); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-104(4)(a) (West 2018) (requiring audits to 
comply with state department of education requirements); DC CODE §
38.1802.04(c)(11)(B)(ix) (2018) (requiring audits to comply with standards issued by U.S.
Comptroller General); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302D-32 (West 2018) (requiring audits to
comply with standards set by authorizer and state department).
121. See Green et al., supra note 103, at 26 for examples.
122. Ronald Huefner & Marie Blouin, Control Issues in Charter Schools: An 





125. AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AU SECTION 110: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR 1593, 1593 (Nov. 
1972), https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/Downloadable 
Documents/AU-00110.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XM27-ED9E]. 
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requires auditors to conduct “brainstorming” sessions to 
determine how a client might be vulnerable to fraud.126 SAS 109 
requires auditors to understand the entity and its environment, 
evaluate the attendant risks of material misstatements, and 
address significant risks that require special consideration.127 
Established by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”), GAGAS sets the standards for auditors of 
governmental entities.128  GAGAS requires auditors to identify 
any “laws, regulations, contracts or grant agreements that are 
significant within the context of the audit objectives.” 129  This 
consideration requires auditors to design auditing procedures “to 
obtain reasonable assurance of detecting instances of 
noncompliance.”130 
2. Academies
The Academies Financial Handbook, which sets out the 
guidelines for the financial management of ATs, requires these 
entities to appoint an auditor to “certify whether their annual 
accounts present a true and fair view of the trust’s financial 
performance and position.”131  In 2013, the ESFA amended that 
Handbook to require ATs to pay no more than the costs of goods 
provided by related parties.132  In 2014, the Handbook 
126. AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS., AU SECTION 316: 
CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, 1719, 1724, 
https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-
00316.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8D9-EV9Y].  
127. AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AU SECTION 314: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ENTITY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT AND ASSESSING THE RISKS OF 
MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT 1667, 1673, 1691-94, 
https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-
00314.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7EP-GUGV]. 
128. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS: 2011 
REVISION (Dec. 2011), http://gao.gov/assets/590/587281.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7ER-
C6NY]. 
129. Id. at 140.
130. Id.
131. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018: 
FOR ACADEMY TRUSTEES, MEMBERS, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, CHIEF FINANCIAL 
OFFICERS AND AUDITORS 36 (Sep. 1, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academies-financial-handbook 
[https://perma.cc/LPX7-AAPV].   
132. EDUC. FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2013: FOR 
ACADEMY TRUSTEES, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS AND 
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introduced a de minimis threshold of £2,500 on at-cost 
requirements that applied to related-party transactions.133  ATs 
had to pay no more than cost for any transaction above this 
limit.134  The National Audit Office (“NAO”)135—Parliament’s 
auditing body136—as well as Parliament137 have expressed doubt 
that auditors can enforce the at cost policy.  One concern is that 
it will be difficult for auditors to assess professional services, 
especially “where the academy is effectively buying-in an 
expert’s time and knowledge rather than goods with an historic 
cost.”138  Another problem that auditors face is that the at-cost 
policy can be subject to manipulation.139 
Instead of enforcing the at cost policy, we believe it would 
be wiser for auditors to develop protocols for identifying and 
scrutinizing particularly risky related-party transactions.  This 
advice would be consistent with International Standard of 
Auditing 550—a standard that academy auditors must 
follow140—which governs related-party transactions.141  As the 
standard explains, “an understanding of the entity’s related party 
relationships and transactions is relevant to the auditors’ 
evaluation of whether one or more fraud risk factors are 
present . . . because fraud may be more easily committed 
through related parties.”142 
AUDITORS 25 (Sep. 1, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academies-
financial-handbook-2013 [https://perma.cc/2B8E-TMV3].   
133. Id.
134. EDUC. FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2014: FOR 
ACADEMY TRUSTEES, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS AND 
AUDITORS 6 (Sep. 1, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academies-
financial-handbook-2014 [https://perma.cc/F3KY-8VTS].  
135. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 6.
136. NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, ABOUT US, https://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KQW-MAVW]. 
137. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. PUB. ACCOUNTS., ACADEMY SCHOOLS’ 
FINANCES: THIRTIETH REPORT OF SESSION 2017-19 10 (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/760/760.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EJY6-EYE3].   
138.  Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 6. 
139. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. PUB. ACCOUNTS., supra note 137, at 5.
140. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 9.
141. INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS, INT’L AUDITING & ASSURANCE STANDARDS 
BD., INT’L STANDARDS OF AUDITING 550 503 (Dec. 15, 2009), 
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/a029-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-550.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SC5X-DSQN].  
142. Id. at 505-06.
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We believe that auditors should pay particular attention to 
related-party transactions involving the senior executive leaders 
of ATs—these are principals for ATs143 and chief executive 
officers for MATs.144  According to the Handbook, these 
persons should serve as their trusts’ accounting officers.145  
Accounting officers have a personal responsibility to Parliament 
and to the ESFA for the trusts’ finances.146  It is quite possible 
that senior executive leaders who are engaged in questionable 
related-party transactions might use their positions as accounting 
officers to cover their tracks. 
C. Charter School and AT Boards
1. Charter School Governing Boards
Charter school governing boards are legally responsible for 
ensuring the fiscal soundness of their schools.147  However, 
charter school governing boards may be unprepared to fulfill 
this duty because they lack either the training or the 
independence to assess the related-party transactions of their 
EMO agents.  In the Renaissance Academy for Math & Science 
case, for example, one board member testified at trial that he 
incorrectly believed that Imagine Schools had control over the 
board.148  This testimony led the district court to describe the 
member as being “very confused” about his board duties.149  The 
court also found that the governing board was subservient to 
Imagine Schools because the EMO had recruited the board 
members and had the board sign an operating agreement that 
allocated all tax revenues received by the board to the EMO.150 
143. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018, 
supra note 125, at 42. 
144. Id. at 41. 
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13. 
147. Preston C. Green, III, et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to 
Obtain Funding of Private Schools and the Autonomy of Public Schools, 63 EMORY L. J. 
303, 304 (2013).  
148. Renaissance Acad. for Math & Sci. of Mo., Inc. v. Imagine Sch., Inc., No 4:13-
CV-00645-NKL, 2014 WL 3858401, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 4, 2014) . 
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
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Charter school statutes should address the board training 
problem by ensuring that board members receive training with 
respect to their supervisory responsibilities.  Indeed, 13 states 
require governing boards to receive training: Colorado,151 
Delaware,152 Florida,153 Georgia,154 Massachusetts,155 
Minnesota,156 Mississippi,157 Nevada,158 New Jersey,159 New 
Mexico,160 Tennessee,161 Texas,162 and Wisconsin.163  Five of 
these states—Delaware,164 Florida,165 Minnesota,166 New 
Mexico,167 and Texas168—specifically include coverage of 
financial management in their training provisions.  In addition to 
training requirements, states should require governing boards to 
possess expertise in financial management.  Only three states—
Hawaii,169 Louisiana,170 and South Carolina171—impose this 
requirement on their charter school governing boards. 
Charter school laws should also guarantee that governing 
boards are structurally independent from EMOs.  Nine states do 
provide this guarantee.  These states are Colorado,172 
Connecticut,173 Illinois,174 Indiana,175 Maine,176 Michigan,177
151. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-88:2.01(C) (West 2018).
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1803 (West 2018).
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1022.33(9)(j)(4) (West 2018).
154. GA. CODE ANN., § 20-2-2084(f) (West 2018).
155. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.06 (West 2018).
156. MINN. STAT. ANN.  § 124E.07(Subd. 7) (West 2018).
157. 10-402 MISS. CODE REGS. § 2.5 (West 2018).
158. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.246(20) (West 2018).
159. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:32–3.2(a)(2) (West 2018).
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.1 (West 2018).
161. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-111(o) (West 2017).
162. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.123 (West 2017).
163. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (2r)(2)(j) (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40
(2x)(2)(j) (West 2017). 
164. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, § 1803 (West 2019).
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(f)(1) (West 2019).
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127A.19 (West 2019).
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.1 (West 2019).
168. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.123(b)(3)(A) (West 2019).
169. HAW. REV. STAT. § 302D-12(b)(3) (West 2018).
170. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 2101(D)(2) (2018).
171. S.C. STAT. § 59-40-50(B)(9) (2018).
172. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(4)(b) (West 2018).
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(e) (West 2018).
174. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/27A-10.5(e) (West 2018).
175. IND. CODE ANN; § 20-24-3-2.5(4) (West 2018).
176. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8) (West 2018).
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Mississippi,178 Nevada,179 and Rhode Island.180  Further, several 
of these states provide indicia for determining whether a charter 
school governing board is independent from its EMO: 
1)The EMO must not select the members of the governing
board;181
2)The governing board must select, retain, and compensate
the attorney and auditing firm representing the board;182
3)The governing board and the EMO must reach the terms
of the service contract through arms-length negotiations;
and183
4)The EMO must not have control over financial
decisions.184
Charter school board principals may also fail at assessing 
the related-party transactions of EMOs because board members 
have related-party transactions with the charter schools for 
which they are responsible.  Initially, such business 
arrangements may not seem problematic because, typically, 
under nonprofit corporations law, members of these boards can 
recuse themselves from decisions to enter into business 
arrangements with their companies.  However, one wonders 
whether charter school boards can carry out their fiduciary 
duties with respect to the EMO if they also have business 
arrangements with the charter school.  Might they be so 
distracted by their own financial interests that they fail to police 
the behavior of the EMO? 
The predicament of PA Cyber Charter School (PA Cyber) 
illustrates this concern.  At its peak, PA Cyber had an 
enrollment of more than 11,000 students across the state.185  An 
audit conducted by the state auditor general revealed that the 
charter school paid the EMO that provided curriculum and 
177. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.507(1)(f) (West 2018).
178. 10-402 MISS. CODE R. § 1.12(D) (West 2018).
179. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.393(1)(a) (West 2018).
180. R.I. Reg. Text 496815 (West 2018).
181. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(A) (West 2018).
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(e); 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(B); 
R.I. Reg. Text 496815. 
183. IND. CODE ANN; § 20-24-3-2.5(4); 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(C); 10-
402 MISS. CODE R. § 1.12(D)(1). 
184. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.393(1)(a). 
185.  Trombetta Pleads Guilty, MORNING J. (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://www.morningjournalnews.com/news/local-news/2016/08/trombetta-pleads-guilty/ 
[https://perma.cc/NRX9-PUY8].   
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management services to the schools more than $153 million 
from 2011 to 2014, which amounted to nearly half of the 
school’s annual budget.186  The auditing office was especially 
critical of the terms of the management services agreement 
between the charter school and the EMO.187  Instead of using a 
cost-based fee formula, the agreement stipulated that the EMO 
would receive 12 percent of the charter school’s revenues 
received from the state and enrolling school districts.188  By not 
basing payment on actual costs, the state auditor declared that 
the fee structure weakened the level of accountability demanded 
of the EMO.189  The auditing office also found that board 
members had related-party transactions that compromised their 
ability to provide oversight over the management company.190  
For instance, a board member’s son was a director of operations 
for the EMO.191  Another board member was a co-owner of a 
computer equipment company that was paid $1.1 million from 
the charter school.192 
The state auditor general expressed displeasure that neither 
the state’s charter school law nor its ethics statute prohibited 
governing board members from simultaneously serving as 
officers and board members of companies that were providing 
services to PA Cyber.193 As he explained, “such situations 
provide an appearance of a conflict of interest that should be 
mitigated.”194  One of the solutions that the auditor general 
suggested to fix this problem was to make charter school boards 
publicly elected.195  It is doubtful whether this amendment 
186. PA. DEP’T AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT: PENNSYLVANIA CYBER 
CHARTER SCHOOL 28 (Sep. 2016) [hereinafter , 
http://www.paauditor.gov/Media/Default/Reports/PACyberCharterSchool,%20Beaver,%20
092116.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5WE-9SX8].  




191. PENNSYLVANIA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, supra note 186, at 19.
192. Id. at 21. 
193. Id. at 17. 
194. Call To Overhaul PA Charter School Law: Auditor General Calls It The Worst
In The Nation, NEXTSTAR BROADCASTING, (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://www.wearecentralpa.com/news/call-to-overhaul-pa-charter-school-law/558591274 
[https://perma.cc/74J5-69TP].  
195. PA. DEP’T AUDITOR GEN., AUDITOR GENERAL DEPASQUALE SAYS AUDITS OF 
PA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, TWO OTHER SCHOOLS REAFFIRM NEED TO OVERHAUL 
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would counter the specific oversight problem that occurred in 
the case of PA Cyber: i.e., board members who might have 
failed to provide oversight over the EMO because they too were 
benefiting from related-party transactions with the charter 
school.  Rather, legislatures should consider prohibiting board 
members from engaging in related-party transactions with the 
charter schools for which they are responsible.  Indeed, two 
states—Minnesota196 and New Mexico197—have addressed this 
concern by prohibiting persons from serving on a governing 
board if they or their immediate family members own or have a 
significant stake in any entity providing “professional services, 
goods, or facilities” to the charter school. 
2. Academies
AT governing boards have the responsibility of “ensuring 
resources are allocated to strategic priorities and safeguarding 
the highest standards of highest priority”—this responsibility 
encompasses related-party transactions.198  The Handbook 
commands boards to meet this duty by ensuring that 
“requirements for managing related party transactions are 
applied across the trust” and by “manag[ing] personal 
relationships with related parties to avoid real and perceived 
conflicts of interest.”199 
There have been a number of instances in which trustees of 
MATs have benefited from questionable related-party 
transactions between the MATs and the businesses that they 
run.200  The Bright Tribe Multi-Academy Trust is an egregious 
CHARTER SCHOOL LAW (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.paauditor.gov/press-releases/auditor-
general-depasquale-says-audits-of-pa-cyber-charter-school-two-other-schools-reaffirm-
need-to-overhaul-charter-school-law [https://perma.cc/BP2J-4ZSU].   
196. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.07(subdiv. 3)(a) (West 2018).
197. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.2(A) (West 2018).
198. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 4. 
199. EDUC. & SKILLS FUND, AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018, 
supra note 131, at 30. 
200. See, e.g., John Dickens, Revealed: The 23 Trusts that Broke Rules over £4M 
Related-Party Transactions, SCHS. WK. (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://schoolsweek.co.uk/revealed-the-23-trusts-that-broke-rules-over-4m-related-party-
transactions/ [https://perma.cc/N7WR-5W5E]; Jonathan Owen, Exclusive: Former 
Academy Trustee’s Firm Billed More than £6M in ‘Related-Party’ Payments, TES, (Nov. 7, 
2017), https://www.tes.com/news/exclusive-former-academy-trustees-firm-billed-more-
ps6m-related-party-payments [https://perma.cc/G2MX-6F6K].  
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example.  This MAT, which ran 10 academy schools, paid 
companies owned by its director £3.9 million in 2016 and 
£681,000 in 2017.201  A governmental investigation of the MAT 
revealed that 80% of its governors had engaged in related-party 
transactions.202  Arrangements such as this one raise doubts as to 
whether board members are fulfilling their responsibility to 
protect the financial interests of their MATs. 
The Handbook further advises trustees to refer to the 
guidance provided by the Charity Commission,203 the regulatory 
body for all charities in England and Wales.204  The Charity 
Commission’s document titled The Essential Trustee: What You 
Need to Know, What You Need to Do provides that the actions a 
board takes with respect to related-party transactions depends 
“on the circumstances and the seriousness of the conflict of 
interest.”205  Generally, the affected trustee should be absent 
from any part of the meeting where the issue is being 
discussed.206  The affected trustee should withdraw from any 
decision-making on that issue.207 
However, Gillian Allcroft, the Deputy Chief Executive of 
the National Governance Association (“NGA”)—an 
independent charity that seeks to increase the effectiveness of 
AT governing boards208—doubts whether this approach is 
sufficient in situations that “involve significant financial 
201. Helen Ward, Exclusive: Bright Tribe Pays £680K in Related-Party 
Transactions, TES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.tes.com/news/exclusive-bright-tribe-pays-
ps680k-related-party-transactions [https://perma.cc/ZAS8-HHXY].  
202. Pippa Allen-Kinros, Embattled Bright Tribe Academy Trust to Close, SCHS.
WEEK. (July 16, 2018), https://schoolsweek.co.uk/embattled-bright-tribe-academy-trust-to-
close/ [https://perma.cc/ND75-B53S].   
203. Supra note 131, at 10.
204.  CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, ABOUT US, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about 
[https://perma.cc/J3ZT-3FDD] (last visited March 30, 2019).   
205. CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, THE ESSENTIAL TRUSTEE: WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW, WHAT YOU NEED TO DO 18 (May 3, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-essential-trustee-what-you-need-to-
know-cc3/the-essential-trustee-what-you-need-to-know-what-you-need-to-do 
[https://perma.cc/29F5-WPGX].   
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. NAT’L GOV. ASS’N., WELCOME TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
ASSOCIATION, https://www.nga.org.uk/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Z9B-8S5D] (last 
visited March 30, 2019). 
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transactions and family ties.”209  As she explains (from the 
perspective of an AT board): 
If you award a firm closely associated with a trustee a 
contract will you genuinely be able to demonstrate that you 
weren’t influenced by her/his status?. . .The truth is 
regardless of how stringent you have been with your 
processes the perception that the trustee has benefited will 
linger. Alternatively, you may unconsciously look for 
reasons not to award the trustee’s firm the contract to avoid 
such a charge—but they have may have been the best 
provider. Neither outcome is satisfactory. Better not to put 
oneself in that position in the first place.210 
The guidance provided by the Charity Commission lends 
some support to Allcroft’s skepticism.  For example, The 
Essential Trustee advises that in cases involving serious 
conflicts, the company should take one of the following actions: 
(1) obtain permission from the Commission; (2) refrain from
going forward with the conflict; or (3) require the trustee to
resign.211  Similarly, the Commission’s document titled
Conflicts of Interest: A Guide for Charity Trustees provides that
in situations involving serious conflicts of interest, charity
boards should remove the conflict by: (1) “not pursuing the
course of action”; (2) “proceeding with the issue in a different
way so that the conflict of interest does not arise”; or (3) “not
appointing a particular trustee or securing a trustee
resignation.”212
As noted above, in the United States charter-school context, 
two states have found that related-party transactions between 
board members or their immediate families are so serious that 
they cannot be resolved by having the affected members absent 
themselves from discussions and excuse themselves from 
deliberations.  Instead, these states have banned such persons 
from serving on charter school governing boards.  Given the 
209. Gillian Allcroft, Ethical Goverance and Leadership, 7 ACAD. MAG. 28 (Aug.
2017), http://academymag.co.uk/ [https://perma.cc/54XA-SMXQ]. 
210. Id.
211. CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, THE ESSENTIAL TRUSTEE, supra
note 205. 
212. CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: A 
GUIDE FOR CHARITY TRUSTEES 5 (May 1, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflicts-of-interest-a-guide-for-charity-
trustees-cc29 [https://perma.cc/X9F8-EMNP].  
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concerns raised about related-party transactions compromising 
the ability of AT boards to act as fiscal stewards, Parliament 
might consider imposing a similar ban. 
One might ask why we would call for Parliament to 
consider banning related-party transactions for AT board 
members, but not call for a similar ban on the AT’s senior 
executives.  We respond by acknowledging that related-party 
transactions can provide opportunities for ATs to obtain 
economies of scale and in-house expertise.213  But we also 
recognize that a core function of AT boards is “to oversee 
financial performance and make sure money is well spent.”214  If 
evidence suggests that related-party transactions are 
compromising the ability of boards to carry out this duty, then a 
ban would be appropriate. 
C. Authorizers & ESFA
1. Charter Schools
Charter school authorizers review applications to determine 
whether to grant charters, monitor the schools for which they are 
responsible, and decide whether to revoke or renew charters.215  
Charter school authorizers are “ultimately responsible for the 
fiscal oversight of each charter school they oversee.”216  Their 
duty to ensure the fiscal health of charter schools extends “from 
application approval to oversight and monitoring to closure or 
renewal.”217 
Consequently, authorizers play a pivotal role in guarding 
against unreasonable related-party transactions between EMOs 
213. Review of Related Party Transactions, supra note 75, at 21.
214. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 25.
215. Jennifer Thomsen, Charter Authorizers: What they are & why they matter, 
EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, www.ecs.org [https://perma.cc/AX3V-8TSM] 
(last visited March 6, 2019).  
216. A User’s Guide to Fiscal Oversight: A Toolkit for Charter School Authorizers 
2, NAT’L CHARTER SCH. RESOURCE CTR. (2016), 
https://www.charterschoolcenter.org/sites/default/files/Fiscal%20Oversight%20Toolkit%2
0-%20Authorizers%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/4R3U-N6PK].  
217. Id.
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and for-profit related parties.218  However, only two states— 
California and Connecticut—explicitly empower authorizers to 
review and approve these business arrangements.219  California’s 
law will go into effect on July 1, 2019.220  On that date, the law 
stipulates that petitions for charter school applications, renewals 
or material revisions “shall not operate as, or be operated by . . . 
a for-profit educational management organization.”221  The law 
defines the term “operate as, or be operated by” to encompass 
the day-to-day management of a charter school.222  The statute 
forbids charter schools from entering into subcontracts “to avoid 
the requirements of this paragraph.”223  Consequently, this law 
appears to prevent nonprofit EMOs from contracting with for-
profit related-parties for day-to-day operations.224  Connecticut’s 
administrative code places a number of limitations on related-
party transactions.225  These transactions are permissible under 
the following conditions: 
[T]he costs incurred are (1) limited to the actual cost of
goods or services; (2) applicable, appropriate and necessary
to the transaction; and (3) do not exceed the fair market rate
or value that a prudent person in a non-related party
transaction would incur under the circumstances prevailing
at the time.226
We have two concerns with California’s approach.  First,
we oppose the idea of banning related-party transactions 
involving for-profit entities.  Although we are concerned with 
the abuse of these types of contractual arrangements, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that in some instances, a related-party 
transaction might constitute the best deal for the charter school. 
218. Roxana Marachi, Is Charter School Fraud the New Enron?, EDURESEARCHER
(March 16, 2017), https://eduresearcher.com/2017/03/16/charter-enron/ 
[https://perma.cc/HR3V-V92H]. 
219. See generally  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47604 (West 2019); C.G.S.A. §§ 10-66m-1- 
10-66mm-7 (West 2019). 
220. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47604(b)(1) (2018).
221. Id.
222. Id. § (2)(A)(iii).
223. Id. § (2)(B).
224. Derek Black, California Strikes Major Blow for Non-Profit Charter Schools, 
EDUC. L. PROF. BLOG (Sep. 10, 2018), https://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/education_law/2018/09/california-strikes-major-blow-to-for-profit-charter-
schools.html [https://perma.cc/6KDT-D3RA].  
225. See C.G.S.A. §§ 10-66m1-10-7mm.
226. C.G.S.A. § 10-66mm-5(c).
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Second, we find it troubling that California’s provision 
addresses only contracts that deal with day-to-day management. 
Thus, this language may fail to address other potential areas of 
abuse, such as real estate.227  Instead, the bill provides that these 
business agreements fall under the responsibility of charter 
school boards.  As we have explained above, states should 
provide boards with training that addresses related-party 
transactions so that they can be up to this task.228 
By contrast, Connecticut’s regulations provide better 
guidance for its authorizer, the state department of education. 
By instructing the department to examine the appropriateness 
and necessity of the related-party transaction and to ensure that 
each transaction does not exceed fair market value, the 
regulations call for the authorizer to guard against abuse while 
allowing for the possibility that the transaction might provide 
the best goods or services to the charter school.229  However, we 
advise other states to be wary of adopting Connecticut’s at-cost 
requirement because of the concerns raised with respect to 
academies.230 
2. Academies
The ESFA is responsible for providing financial oversight 
over academy schools.231  This responsibility includes related-
party transactions.232  In 2013, the Handbook required academy 
trusts (ATs) to obtain approval for related-party transactions that 
were “novel” or “contentious.”233  Novel transactions “are those 
in which the academy trust has no experience, or are outside the 
range of normal business activity for the trust.”234  Contentious 
transactions are “those which might give rise to criticism of the 
227. See Section III(B)(1).
228. See Section III(C)(1).
229. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47604(2)(A).
230. See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-66mm-5.
231. Sally Weale, MPs Criticise Failure to Tackle Excessive Salaries in Academies, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian 
.com/education/2018/mar/30/mps-criticise-government-oversight-of-academy-school-
finances [https://perma.cc/UC57-VSBW].   
232. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
233. EDUC. FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2013, supra 
note 132, at 22-23.  
234. Id. at 22. 
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trust by the public or the media.”235  In 2017, the Handbook was 
amended to include “repercussive transactions”—”those which 
are likely to cause pressure on other trusts to take a similar 
approach and hence have wider financial implications.”236 
The House of Commons expressed dissatisfaction with this 
line of review, noting that “[i]n practice this means that the 
majority of day to day related party transactions require no prior 
approval.”237  Indeed, this legislative body expressed the 
concern that the ESFA only became aware of most related-party 
transactions when it reviewed the annual accounts.238  To 
prevent the abuse of related-party transactions, the House of 
Commons recommended that the ESFA amend the Handbook to 
prohibit ATs from entering into related-party transactions 
without the agency’s approval.239  The ESFA did not adopt the 
House of Commons’ blanket recommendation to approve all 
related-party transactions—probably because of the sheer size of 
the academy sector.  However, the agency did decide to impose 
a requirement, starting in April 2019, that ATs must obtain prior 
approval from the ESFA for contracts with a related party if a 
single contract, or the sum of all contracts with that party in the 
same financial year exceed £20,000.240 
The ESFA £20,000-threshold requirement for targeting 
related-party transactions is an improvement over the agency’s 
policy requiring the review of novel, contentious, or 
repercussive transactions.  First, the monetary threshold policy 
will actually trigger a review of related-party transactions in a 
way that the prior policy did not.  Second, by setting a monetary 
threshold before conducting a review of the transactions 
235. Id. at 23. 
236. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2017: 
FOR ACADEMY MEMBERS, TRUSTEES, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, CHIEF FINANCIAL 
OFFICERS AND AUDITORS 30 (2017), https://www. 
gov.uk/government/publications/academies-financial-handbook [https://perma.cc/FV4K-
KPDM]. 
237. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, ACADEMY SCHOOL’S 




239. Id. at 5.
240. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018, 
supra note 131, at 31. 
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between an AT and a related party, the ESFA has taken steps to 
avoid being overextended. 
D. Charter School Authorizers/State Level Auditor &
ESFA 
1. Charter Schools
Charter school monitoring systems authorize regulatory 
agencies, including state departments of education and state 
auditors, to conduct investigations when they receive notice of 
possible abuses of related-party transactions.241  These entities 
rely heavily on whistleblowers to provide them with 
information.242  Therefore, state legislatures should consider 
instituting approaches that would motivate whistleblowers to 
expose wasteful or fraudulent related-party transactions. 
Two federal statutes show that state legislatures could 
encourage whistleblowers to come forward by offering them 
financial awards.  The first statute is the False Claims Act 
(FCA),243 which imposes liability on any person who 
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”244  The FCA 
encourages whistleblowers to bring civil actions, or qui tam 
lawsuits, on behalf of the federal government.245  
Whistleblowers can obtain a bounty ranging from 15% to 25% 
of the government’s recovery.246 
The second statute is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).247  Enacted in 
response to the financial crisis of 2008, this statute seeks to 
prevent another economic meltdown by placing more stringent 
241. Green et al., supra note 103 at 28-30.
242. CTR. POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., RISKING PUBLIC MONEY: CALIFORNIA 
CHARTER SCHOOL FRAUD (Mar. 2015), http://laschoolreport.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Charter-Schools-California-Report-b1-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4QF-9AV7].   
243. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-33 (West 2018).
244. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
245. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(1), (c).
246. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d).
247. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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regulations on lenders and banks.248  Dodd-Frank also 
encourages whistleblowers to expose violations of U.S. 
securities laws through the establishment of a whistleblower 
incentive program.249  Administered by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the whistleblower program gives 
financial awards to whistleblowers for original information that 
leads to monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million.250  
Whistleblower awards range from 10% to 30% of the sanction 
amount.251 
Both the FCA252 and Dodd-Frank253 protect whistleblowers 
from retaliatory actions from their employers, such as discharge, 
demotion, suspension, threats, or harassments, or any other 
discrimination.  These statutes also provide several remedies for 
whistleblowers including reinstatement, double back pay, 
litigation costs, and attorneys’ fees.254 
The financial awards provided by the FCA and Dodd-Frank 
have enabled the federal government to recover a great deal of 
money.  In 2017, the federal government recovered $3.7 billion 
in settlements and judgments pursuant to the False Claims Act; 
$3.4 billion came from qui tam lawsuits.255  The financial 
incentives of the federal False Claims Act have been so 
successful that more than 50% of states have enacted their own 
false claims acts.256  Since 2011, the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblowing incentive program has led to the imposition of 
$1.5 billion in monetary sanctions.257 
248. CTR. AM. PROGRESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF DODD-FRANK, IN 6 CHARTS
(March 27, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/ 
2017/03/27/429256/importance-dodd-frank-6-charts/ [https://perma.cc/MX3S-66WB]. 
249. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2018). 
250. 15 U.S.C.A § 78u-6(a)(1).
251. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1).
252. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h)(1). 
253. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
254. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h)(2) (FCA); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (Dodd-Frank)
255. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RECOVERS $3.7 BILLION FROM FALSE CLAIMS ACT
CASES IN FISCAL YEAR 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 
[https://perma.cc/7A4L-NEK5]. 
256. Marianne W. Nitsch, Note: Fraud on the Classroom: Why State False Claims 
Acts Are Not the Solution to All Fraud on State and Local Governments, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
1009, 1010 (2015).  
257. Jason Zuckerman & Matt Stock, One Billion Reasons Why the SEC
Whistleblower Reward Program Is Effective, FORBES (July 18, 2017), 
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Taking impetus from the FCA and Dodd-Frank, state 
legislatures should consider developing whistleblower incentive 
programs for their charter schools.  Specifically, these programs 
would do the following: (1) provide financial awards to 
whistleblowers for coming forward with information that would 
lead to a successful recovery of public funds; and (2) protect 
whistleblowers from retaliatory employment actions by charter 
schools, EMOs, or their affiliates. 
Charter school investigatory bodies should also target 
certain types of related-party transactions for periodic reviews. 
For example, evidence suggests that related-party transactions 
involving real estate poses a problem to the charter school 
sector.258  To combat such abuse, investigatory bodies can 
periodically examine the real estate deals to which charter 
schools have entered. 
2. Academies
The ESFA investigates financial irregularities in the 
academy sector including those involving related-party 
transactions.  Similar to charter schools, the ESFA relies on 
whistleblower revelations.259  In fact, a freedom of information 
request revealed that from 2013 to 2017, whistleblowers 
triggered 14 out of 15 investigations into academy finances.260  
Thus, we examine the incentives provided for whistleblowers to 
come forward with respect to AT whistleblowers. 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998261 and the 




258. See Section II(A)(1).
259. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
260. Jess Staufenberg, Over 90% of Investigations into Academy Finances Are a 
Result of Whistleblowers, SCH. WEEK (July 10, 2017), https://schoolsweek.co.uk/over-90-
of-investigations-into-academy-finances-are-a-result-of-whistleblowers/ 
[https://perma.cc/8LFA-VVMQ].   
261. See generally Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (Eng.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/96XR-
4YSK]. 
262.  Enterprise & Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/CMG6-
TJ3S].  
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“workers” who make disclosures in the public interest from 
dismissal and detrimental treatment.  To receive protection, 
workers must reasonably believe that they are making 
disclosures in the public interest.263  Protected disclosures 
include criminal offenses, failure to comply with legal 
obligations, and the concealment of these actions.264  Workers 
who believe they have suffered from retaliation may seek 
financial compensation from an employment tribunal.265 
Neither the PIDA nor the ERRA includes a whistleblower 
incentive program similar to Dodd Frank or the FCA.  After the 
passage of the ERRA, the U.K. government in 2013 initiated a 
call for evidence to determine whether it should make other 
changes in its whistleblowing framework.266  The call 
considered, inter alia, whether the U.K. should provide financial 
incentives to whistleblowers.267  A year later, the government 
issued a response rejecting the adoption of financial 
incentives.268 Although the government “remained unconvinced 
that the introduction of financial incentives would change the 
cultural landscape in a positive way,” it did allow that “in due 
course,” it would consider employing financial incentives “in 
specific organisations or in very specific types of cases.”269  
Given the number of questionable related-party transactions 
occurring within academy trusts, the government might consider 
adopting a whistleblower incentive program for this sector. 
Furthermore, the ESFA should not wait for whistleblowers 
to provide information for investigations.  We suggest that once 
an AT crosses the £20,000 threshold for transactions with a 
related company, which would require approval from the ESFA, 
the agency should conduct periodic reviews of that business 
relationship.  In 2016, Sir Amyas Morse, the Auditor General of 
the NAO, provided support for this suggestion during a House 
263. Id. at § 17.
264. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, supra note 261, at § 1. 
265. Id. at § 3.
266. See generally Government Response, Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills, Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence (June 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/whistleblowing-framework-call-for-
evidence [https://perma.cc/R6QU-TPZ9].  
267. Id. at 19. 
268. Id. at 20. 
269. Id. at 25. 
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of Commons Education Committee discussing the financial 
management of the DfE.270  Morse called for the DfE and the 
ESFA to develop a number of “leading indicators” that would 
cause the agency to investigate an AT.271  One example for 
further scrutiny involved situations where “there were a lot of 
apparent conflict of interest issues to be managed.”272 
CONCLUSION 
Related-party transactions involving private companies and 
their for-profit affiliates have bedeviled both U.S. charter 
schools and England’s academies.  Using comparative legal 
research methodologies, this article has attempted to determine 
why the respective monitoring systems have had a difficult time 
regulating related-party transactions and offer suggestions for 
improvement.  Because our review has found such remarkable 
similarities between the monitoring systems for charter schools 
and academies, it is unsurprising that the recommendations for 
improving these monitoring systems are so similar. 
270. See generally Education Committee, Financial Management at the Department
for Education, 2016, HC 203 (UK). 
271. Id. at Q112. 
272. Id. 
